discomfort was even more marked in the ways in which students talked about mental health and psychiatry. Psychiatry, one student explained, was an unpopular discipline: 'because if you're a student you want things simple. You want …signs, symptoms, organic signs and symptoms and a proper diagnosis… whereas psychiatry it's a lot more …understanding and, you really have to acquire the skill of getting into people's minds and finding out what the matter is.' (Liang, Year-3) More generally, people suffering from mental illness were frequently perceived by students as 'unpredictable', and symptoms of mental illness were considered difficult to explain 'scientifically' and even more difficult to relate to. For students in later years it was not unusual to articulate a clear distinction between the physical and the mental 5 . Students' habit of somehow separating the psychological aspects of human suffering from the physical ones was also evident in the ways they sometimes conceptualised disease as a thing in itself, operating a distinction between 'the disease and the person' (e.g. James, Year-5; Sandro, Year-2 equivalent). At least on the basis of these data, integrated approaches to the human experience do not seem to have found fertile ground in health professional education. The lack of more integrated conceptualisations of the learning and practice of medical knowledge(s) has important consequences in terms of the reproduction and circulation of hegemonic medical discourses. We want to emphasise here that the sort of distinctions we reported can be seen as an indication of a deeply rooted issue about the epistemological hierarchies that still underpin medical education cultures. These hierarchies tend to position biomedical science as a superior, more valid, form of knowledge to all others, undermining the educational discourses that promote person-centred health care practice, collaborative approaches to clinical interactions and more authentic dialogue in medical work 6 . More integrated understandings cannot be achieved solely through curriculum changes that follow a zero-sum model, i.e. by which more curricular space is allocated to 'soft' subjects in order to complement the 'hard sciences' teaching. Rather, we argue, change needs to take place through active questioning of this very distinction. We would suggest that the kind of epistemological reflexivity that is evident in Seppilli's account needs to become a pervasive and mundane feature of medical schools, such that learners, teachers and researchers are made routinely conscious of the ways in which they construct and classify forms of knowledge. The called for shift would be broadly analogous to the one that has gradually happened in relation to classifications and stereotypes around gender and 'race'. Once again the task is to recognise but not reify differences; and to seek practices that embody genuinely equal respect by challenging classifications, separations and hierarchies that are constructed as 'natural'. 
